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THE PRACTICE AND POLITICS OF 
NATION-BUILDING
If there is a “third rail” of U.S. foreign policy, nation-building 
would be high on the list of contenders. Yet if the word itself 
is universally decried, the policies that characterize it have 
played a recurring role in America’s, and the international 
community’s, interventions abroad. WPR examines The Prac-
tice and Politics of Nation-Building.
BY KAROUN DEMIRJIAN
BY DAVID CHANDLER
BY DAMIEN KINGSBURY 
1BY KAROUN DEMIRJIAN
THE POLITICS OF NATION-BUILDING
“We must make sure that the deployment of our 
troops is not merely the appetizer and that the 
main course becomes . . . an outbreak of nation-
building and infrastructure construction and 
resources which are . . . not within our capacity 
to provide for everyone around the world.”
A fter eight years of operations in Af-ghanistan, and the recent announce-ment that additional troop deploy-
ments will continue to execute a strategy that 
stretches the military beyond its traditional com-
bat role for at least another 18 months, the above 
quotation could easily convey the commitment-
fatigue prevalent in Washington these days.
But the ominous warning, delivered on the 
Senate floor, has nothing to do with the fear of 
becoming further mired in a long-term humani-
tarian mission in Afghanistan. 
The year? 1995. The speaker? Former Sen. John 
Ashcroft. And the subject? The U.S. interven-
tion in Bosnia. 
Since the end of the Cold War, the United States 
has repeatedly struggled with the question of 
how much is too much when it comes to foreign 
military operations. The debate routinely comes 
down to how far-reaching a military mandate 
presidents can chase before crossing into the 
political no man’s land of “nation-building.”
Nation-building -- or state-building, the term 
some prefer to employ -- has long been recog-
nized as a tool of foreign policy. Its basic prem-
ise -- that of an intervention in a way that affects 
the governance of a state -- can be and has been 
applied in a variety of different circumstances: 
from propping up states that are failing (whether 
due to corruption or conflict), to establishing 
entirely new political orders (in the case of de-
colonization, secession, or other declarations 
of independence). Nation-building invariably 
involves the military, but tasks it with projects 
that are more accurately classified as political 
and economic development efforts than as com-
bat operations. The most common undertakings 
include establishing local security and police 
forces; creating the structures necessary for rule 
of law, including judicial systems; installing 
legitimate political leadership (the U.S. prefers 
the stamp of approval brought by a democratic 
election for this purpose); and guaranteeing the 
basic delivery of goods and services. 
In application, nation-building has, at best, a 
checkered past in U.S. politics, ranging from 
almost universally touted successes, such as the 
campaign to rebuild Germany following World 
War II, to infamous failures, such as the short-
lived U.S. intervention in Somalia. It was the lat-
ter episode that effectively gave pariah status to 
the terminology of “nation-building,” if not the 
concept as a whole.
As much as “nation-building” devolved into a 
term of opprobrium in the post-Somalia Clin-
ton-era ‘90s, the United States has, since that 
period, experimented liberally and frequently 
with broad-based military-cum-development 
ventures -- from government intervention mea-
sures in Haiti and Bosnia, to state-creation ex-
ercises in East Timor and Kosovo, to the newest 
incarnation of nation-building as part of the War 
on Terror in Afghanistan and Iraq.
That dichotomy has had an effect on the political 
debate in Washington. The lessons of the ‘90s 
would seem to suggest more-or-less defined 
roles for Republicans and Democrats in their 
approach to nation-building practices, with 
the former vehemently opposing them and the 
latter being more supportive. But the reality is 
that politicians of both parties almost uniformly 
disavow and decry the label. That has resulted 
in a blurring of the ideological lines, and in 
some cases, a near-complete role reversal in who 
supports the policies that actually characterize 
nation-building. 
That is not to suggest, however, that there is 
some underlying clarity to the debate over how, 
why, or if nation-building activities should be 
undertaken or avoided. As the current rhetoric 
surrounding Afghanistan shows, there is as little 
consensus on where “nation-building” starts as 
there is on how missions that engage in it can 
end.
-0-
T he U.S. has engaged in nation-building ventures ever since it became an economic 
power in the late-19th century, even if politicians 
weren’t then using the term. But the first policy 
victory for a formal nation-building program 
didn’t come until after World War II, with the 
reconstruction of Germany and Japan.
The reconstruction efforts known as the Mar-
shall Plan, which provided billions of dollars 
worth of humanitarian aid in the form of food, 
clothing, health care, and agricultural, educa-
tion, and infrastructural reforms, are widely 
pointed to as the original U.S. model for success-
ful nation-building. Well-funded and organized, 
and relatively quickly executed -- the program 
in its entirety lasted from 1948-1952 -- the plan 
is credited with resuscitating the decimated na-
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tional infrastructure of Germany. It, along with 
the concomitant financial and political interven-
tion in postwar Japan, are widely touted as proof 
of the power of nation-building as a tool for pro-
moting international peace and security. 
But that conclusion comes with the privilege 
of hindsight. The program as it unfolded was a 
clear example of controversial mission creep.
“The economic reconstruction came only later, 
as it became apparent that you weren’t likely 
to sustain the democratic reforms unless there 
was a subsequent improvement in the economic 
conditions,” said Amb. James Dobbins, director 
of the International Security and Defense Policy 
center at the RAND Corporation and a former 
U.S. Special Envoy in Kosovo, Bosnia, Haiti, 
Somalia, and Afghanistan.
America’s initial goals for Germany were al-
most purely political: to demobilize the mili-
tary, to establish war crimes tribunals, and to 
establish democratic institutions. In Japan, the 
political goals were similarly narrow, the main 
differences being that political institutions were 
organized based on the model of pre-existing 
Japanese parliamentary structures, including 
preserving the seat of the emperor.
Expanding U.S. aid beyond those early param-
eters was not an easy sell. Nevertheless, Truman 
administration officials went about advocating 
for such an expansion with a full-throated en-
dorsement of nation-building as a policy to be 
embraced on its merits. As Secretary of State 
George Marshall said at the unveiling of the plan 
that would bear his name in 1947, “It is logical 
that the United States should do whatever it is 
able to do to assist in the return of normal eco-
nomic health to the world, without which there 
can be no political stability and no assured 
peace.”
Such unfiltered praise for nation-building is 
rarely found in today’s debates. But the tenor of 
the criticism that was at the time directed against 
the proposed long-term economic undertaking 
has a similar ring to attacks leveled today. In the 
late-1940s, Sen. Robert A. Taft led a contingent 
of Republicans who criticized the program as 
a massive government spending program that 
would aggravate domestic shortages. President 
Harry Truman was forced to lobby Congress 
and travel the country to drum up support for the 
Economic Cooperation Act, which came in at a 
price tag of about $12.7 billion over four years 
-- a significant sum considering the country’s 
annual GDP at the time hovered around $258 
billion (compared to $14.2 trillion today).
The size and breadth of postwar reconstruction 
projects has, of course, never been replicated in 
more recent nation-building experiments. But 
the factional split between Republicans and 
Democrats over whether and when the costs of 
nation-building were justifiable characterized 
the debate over most nation-building operations 
in the ‘90s, when the U.S. resumed the practice 
under President Bill Clinton through interven-
tions in Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia and Kosovo. 
R olling out their reconstruction plans on the heels of the most massive global war in history, Truman and his Demo-
cratic allies in Congress were able to accuse 
their Republican critics of being isolationists. 
But the comparative frequency and far-flung 
nature of the interventions that started during 
the Clinton years forced politicians in favor of 
nation-building to answer cost concerns, which 
often meant handicapping the potential for long-
term success with an overly rosy forecast of 
short-term results. 
It should be noted that Republicans were not 
always opposed to committing U.S. troops to 
nation-building activities. Presidents Ronald 
Reagan and George H.W. Bush had ordered two 
relatively contained and successful democracy-
promotion ventures during the 1980s -- one in 
Grenada, the other in Panama. And in the im-
mediate aftermath of the Cold War, the potential 
use of the global governance system in the way 
it had first been intended -- to stave off conflict 
through peacekeeping operations -- was an op-
tion that generated enthusiasm on both sides of 
the aisle. 
It was a bipartisan group of lawmakers -- led 
by Paul Simon and Nancy Kestenbaum in the 
House, and Joe Biden and Bob Dole in the Sen-
ate -- who pressed the first President Bush to de-
ploy U.S. troops and other resources in response 
to reports of widespread starvation in Somalia. 
And it was Bush who committed U.S. troops 
-- 25,000 of them -- to the international humani-
tarian force (UNITAF) deployed to Somalia in 
1992, promising that the engagement would be a 
short one. Only 1,200 were involved in the force 
(UNOSOM II) that, under President Clinton, 
remained in Somalia with a nation-building 
mandate to develop infrastructure, restore law 
and order, and establish a representative govern-
ment.
But as Somalia began its descent into anarchy 
in 1993 and the U.S. suffered its first casualties, 
Republican lawmakers began to voice objections 
to what they now saw as an open-ended com-
mitment in both time and scope. They demanded 
that the U.S. “leave [Somalia] and leave soon,” as 
Sen. John McCain put it, in contrast to President 
Clinton’s desire to stay and “do the job right.” 
While all U.S. troops were eventually pulled 
out by March 1994, the Republican opposition 
to nation-building coalesced during the Somalia 
mission, and solidified further during Clinton’s 
first self-generated mission in Haiti. 
To intervention-minded liberals, Haiti was the 
perfect exercise: a nearby failing state with a 
growing refugee problem, in desperate need of 
humanitarian assistance and political stabiliza-
tion in the wake of a coup. The initial efforts 
were successful: The U.S. avoided an all-out 
“invasion,” sending in troops to oversee the 
restoration of Jean-Bertrand Aristide to the 
presidency. But Republicans warned against a 
lasting quagmire as several hundred U.S. troops 
buckled down to the business of economic and 
social engineering projects, which by the end of 
the decade had still not fixed the fundamental 
problem in Haiti -- continued instability. 
Despite Republican objections that the U.S. 
could not afford to “right every wrong in the 
world,” as Sen. Phil Gramm declared in criticiz-
ing U.S. plans in Haiti, the Clinton administra-
tion continued to inaugurate new nation-build-
ing or peacekeeping ventures, committing U.S. 
troops -- often under the auspices of NATO, as 
in both Balkan interventions -- at a pace of once 
per year during the early years of his presidency. 
With the exception of Kosovo, the robustness 
of the missions slowed during Clinton’s second 
term, as the U.S. engaged in international mis-
sions in a more behind-the-scenes role. But the 
pace didn’t slacken much.
The results, however, were often not as immedi-
ately apparent as predicted.
“Nation-building really is a very long-term pro-
cess which requires a lot of resources . . . and 
3While generals and policy architects are quick to 
insist that there remains a distinction, the non-
military means being employed are located at the 
same security-stability-humanitarian nexus that 
has been identified as nation-building in other cir-
cumstances. 
there is something wrong in the assumption that 
if we are willing to invest enough money and 
time that we can do it effectively,” said Marina 
Ottaway, a specialist on democracy and post-
conflict resolution at the Carnegie Endowment 
for International Peace.
This is especially true when those resources are 
divided between several missions at the same 
time. While U.S. troops had entirely withdrawn 
from Somalia by the time ground operations be-
gan in Haiti, the United States still maintained a 
contingent in Haiti when NATO forces began air-
strikes on Bosnia in 1995. Likewise, the military 
mission in Bosnia did not end until late-2004, 
well after the U.S. had committed more soldiers 
to assist in the liberation of Kosovo (where the 
U.S. still maintains a military presence).
“That is the dilemma,” Ottaway continued. 
“Kosovo is a very small country . . . but we can-
not do the same in a very large country, and we 
cannot do the same in a lot of small countries at 
the same time. I think it’s quite clear that the re-
sources, no matter the political will, are simply 
not there.”
In a sense, the Clinton administration avoided 
Congressional roadblocks to its nation-building 
efforts by engaging in missions that were con-
centrated geographically -- and through the use 
of executive authority. In each of the campaigns 
of the ‘90s, Clinton committed military forces 
without the advice and consent of Congress, 
exercising his authority under the War Powers 
Resolution to do so. That left his critics with the 
difficult choice of either pulling the plug on U.S. 
troops already deployed, or footing yet another 
bill for the president’s latest mission. When it 
came time to vote, most Republican leaders -- in-
cluding Sens. Dole, McCain, and House Speaker 
Newt Gingrich -- would begrudgingly choose 
the latter.
The pressure to support ongoing military com-
mitments of course took on new significance 
during the Bush administration -- but with the 
party roles reversed.
-0-
I n the 2000 presidential election, when George Bush and Al Gore debated the ap-propriateness of nation-building, Bush fa-
mously declared, “I don’t think our troops ought 
to be used for what’s called nation-building. I 
think our troops ought to be used to fight and 
win war.”
But that hard-and-fast rule did not hold in prac-
tice in the Bush administration’s engagements 
in Iraq and Afghanistan. While both interven-
tions were conceived of and pitched as wars, not 
nation-building ventures, officials soon learned 
that the “light footprint” model of military 
engagement was not a realistic possibility. In 
Iraq, it took only a few months to achieve the 
military’s principal war objectives - namely, to 
depose Saddam Hussein and defeat his army. 
But the challenge of re-establishing stability 
and governing capacity -- through elections, the 
reconfiguration of security forces, and the res-
urrection of infrastructure in the country -- has 
kept an even larger force of U.S. troops than was 
initially deployed engaged in nation-building 
activities for the last six years.
In Afghanistan, the central role of nation-build-
ing in the military mission has been even more 
pronounced. Compared to Iraq, Afghanistan had 
little in the way of pre-existing democratic gov-
ernance infrastructure. The effort to stabilize 
the country has been a longer and harder chal-
lenge, carried out by fewer troops in the midst of 
a more dispersed population. But the counterin-
surgency strategy employed there has demanded 
the same sort of multifaceted approach that 
characterizes nation-building. 
Counterinsurgency strategy is as much about 
non-military efforts to win the population’s 
allegiance as it is about military operations to 
provide security. And while generals and policy 
architects are quick to insist that there remains 
a distinction, the non-military means being 
employed -- such as road-building, construc-
tion of schools, holding national elections, and 
encouraging the development of agricultural 
alternatives to opium -- are located at the same 
security-stability-humanitarian nexus that has 
been identified as nation-building in other cir-
cumstances. 
“The GOP really has changed its view about 
how to do these sorts of missions and the viabil-
ity of trying to do them. . . . They are very much 
endorsing notions of state-building, and they 
are fully behind it in both wars,” said Michael 
O’Hanlon, a senior national security fellow with 
the Brookings Institution. “In the 1990s, a big 
part of their underlying motivation was that they 
didn’t think countries like Bosnia were worth 
the trouble. Now they feel the missions are of 
central significance. . . . But it’s not a practice 
they want to generalize to other cases.”
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One reason for the distinction is the motivating 
factors that led to the various engagements in the 
first place. Under Clinton, most of the nation-
building activities -- whether all-out wars such as 
Kosovo, or the commitment of funds to support 
peace-building operations in places like Sierra 
Leone -- were diplomatically motivated. Though 
orchestrated by and involving the deployment of 
the U.S. military, they were driven primarily by 
the State Department’s desire to participate in 
humanitarian interventions whenever feasible. 
B y contrast, the nation-building ven-tures that began under the Bush ad-ministration -- from the all-out wars in 
Iraq and Afghanistan to the non-combat military 
training being conducted by the newly formed 
Africa Command (AFRICOM) -- were moti-
vated by the war on terror and driven by defense 
strategists. In contrast to Clinton-era interven-
tionists, who sought to use nation-building to 
preserve international peace and security, pro-
tect our allies, and benefit our global standing, 
the Bush administration viewed nation-building 
actions as vital to U.S. domestic security -- the 
“defeat them abroad before they attack us at 
home” approach.
The gulf between the two motivations is so 
broad that there was little pass-off of strategic 
know-how between administrations, even if 
there were potential lessons to be learned that 
could aid in similar on-the-ground operations.
“We know how to do this work, we just haven’t 
figured out how to readjust our bureaucracy in 
ways that we need to,” said Karin von Hippel, di-
rector of the Post-Conflict Resolution project at 
the Center for Strategic and International Stud-
ies. “Even on something as central as a police 
force . . . we’ve been doing this in Haiti, Bosnia. 
But the international community gets ADD with 
politics -- everyone really wants to focus on the 
conflicts of today.”
Today, combat and casualty fatigue is driving 
much of the political discourse. While Repub-
licans continue to warn against becoming mired 
in “nation-building,” it’s Democrats that are 
now quicker to point the finger at what they see 
as the current war’s overly ambitious political 
and economic objectives, even if outlined by a 
Democratic president. 
“Democratic support for nation-building may 
prove to be a little weaker after this war,” said 
O’Hanlon, who suggested that the approach to 
foreign engagements in the aftermath of Af-
ghanistan may revert to something more closely 
resembling the politics of the Clinton era. “If 
you think back to the ‘90s, you didn’t have 
that many enthusiasts. . . . It’s not as if you had 
George Mitchell and Tom Foley campaigning for 
re-election on the idea that we should be doing 
more nation-building.”
But how the U.S. will respond in the future to 
potential nation-building endeavors may de-
pend less on the specifics of what happens in 
Afghanistan and more on what transpires at 
home. President Obama emphasized this point in 
announcing his expanded political strategy for 
Afghanistan, including a 30,000-troop surge, in 
early December.
“We can’t afford to ignore the price of these 
wars. . . . Our prosperity provides a foundation 
for our power: It pays for our military, it under-
writes our diplomacy,” Obama said. “That’s why 
our troop commitment in Afghanistan cannot be 
open-ended, because the nation I’m more inter-
ested in building is our own.”
But demand for assistance shows no real signs 
of abating, whether in areas that are considered 
potential safe havens for terrorism or in states 
whose internal problems have resonated with 
the international community’s conscience. This 
is especially true in Africa, a continent where 
the U.S. has paid almost no military attention, 
outside of training capacity, over the last several 
decades.
“The U.N. has been mounting a new peacekeep-
ing operation every six months, and the U.S. has 
voted for every one of them, so clearly there’s 
a willingness, within limits, to fund these and 
support them politically,” said Dobbins. In order 
to spare the government some of the pressure 
that inevitably surrounds the decision to send 
troops, Dobbins proposed a build-up of non-
military components -- including the capacity to 
deploy aid workers through the U.S. Agency for 
International Development -- to engage in post-
conflict reconstruction in a way that supports 
civilian NGO efforts.
There is also the option of pooling resources with 
the international community under the auspices 
of multilateral missions. But chain-of-command 
concerns have always made such arrangements 
anathema to the U.S. military. And in recent 
experience, the international community has 
proven to be no better organized in its objectives 
than is the U.S. when acting alone. 
“Historically, we never go in saying ‘we never 
intend to leave,’” said Justin Logan, associate 
director of foreign policy studies at the Cato In-
stitute. “The question becomes, when you take 
the lid off, have you in fact created a function-
ing nation-state, or has the presence of troops at 
least served to tamp down violence. We’re not 
very good at it -- but neither is anyone else.”
With the U.S. almost certain to respond to any 
future engagements according to its own domes-
tic political calculus, some experts suggest that 
another way to preserve interest is by refresh-
ing the debate -- and abandoning the poisonous 
term.
“[Nation-building] makes things sound like a 
bottomless pit of spending,” von Hippel said. 
“If you could make it [an optimistic] term -- you 
want to democratize more states, you want states 
to deliver more to their people -- we should be 
able to do the same things with less opposition.”
But short of a wildly successful turnaround in 
Afghanistan, the U.S. is going to have to reverse 
the negative perceptions of such engagements 
that have spread through both parties, in both 
rhetorical and policy terms, to reclaim that sort 
of optimism.
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5Good governance focuses 
on technical and adminis-
trative capacity -- the way 
of rule, rather than the 
representative legitimacy 
of policymaking or its 
derivational authority. 
BY DAVID CHANDLER 
‘GOOD GOVERNANCE’ AND THE LIMITS TO STATE-BUILDING 
IN BOSNIA 
R ecent reports note the stalled nature of progress towards international reform in Bosnia-Herzegovina, with many 
even making exaggerated claims of the threat 
of renewed conflict [http://bit.ly/4cBNq] in the 
tiny state. Nevertheless, the European Union 
state-building project in post-conflict Bosnia-
Herzegovina has largely been seen as a success, 
particularly when compared to U.S.-led state-
building efforts in Iraq and Afghanistan. Clearly 
the problems faced in Bosnia have been on a 
different scale, with a relatively calm security 
situation. However, on its own terms, interna-
tional regulation since the end of the conflict has 
achieved much less than was expected when the 
international state-building project was imple-
mented following the Dayton Peace Agreement 
at the end of 1995. 
One of the reasons for the relative lack of criti-
cism has been that the EU has managed to pres-
ent the failures and problems that have emerged, 
especially in relation to the pace of integration 
and the sustainability of peace, in ways that have 
reinforced its claim to have a vital role in the ex-
port of an external “good governance” agenda. 
On the one hand, the limitations of reform have 
reinforced the EU’s projection of its power as a 
“civilizing mission” into what is perceived to be 
a dangerous vacuum in the region. On the other 
hand, through the emphasis on good governance, 
the EU has sought to avoid the direct political 
responsibilities associated with this power. 
Rather than legitimize its policymaking on the 
basis of representative legitimacy, the EU’s 
framework of good governance undermines 
Bosnian autonomy and self-government, by pri-
oritizing administrative and regulative frame-
works above democratic choices. The limits 
to this process are apparent in the tendency to 
distance policymaking from representative ac-
countability, thereby weakening the legitimacy 
of governing institutions. As a result, though 
Bosnia may have international legal sovereignty, 
it still lacks genuine mechanisms for politically 
integrating its society. 
The policy framework of good governance is 
very different from the modern liberal discourse 
of government. While government presupposes 
a liberal rights-based framing of political legiti-
macy in terms of autonomy and self-determining 
state authority, the discourse of good governance 
focuses on technical and administrative capacity 
-- the way of rule, rather than the representative 
legitimacy of policymaking or its derivational 
authority. 
This shift is vital to understanding the meth-
ods through which the EU can both export its 
policy priorities and claim a legitimate author-
ity to judge the capacities of new member and 
candidate states. The export of good governance 
presents the EU’s external engagement as a 
prerequisite for policy progress, rather than as 
an exception to the norm of sovereignty that 
requires special justification. It is an interven-
tion whose legitimacy, and that of the policy 
prescriptions attached to it, is judged in techni-
cal or administrative terms, rather than liberal 
democratic ones.
T he framework of good governance does not critique sovereignty on the basis of an overt discussion of the right to inter-
vene or a responsibility to protect, which would 
undermine formal political and legal equality. 
Rather it does so on the basis of the need for 
external expertise to develop and capacity-build 
the institutions of rule. In the terminology of 
influential policy analysts Claire Lockhart and 
Ashraf Ghani, this external governance as-
sistance does not undermine sovereignty, but 
rather supports it through overcoming the “sov-
ereignty gap” represented by the technical and 
administrative weaknesses of states in the re-
gion (“Fixing Failed States,” Oxford University 
Press, 2008). Through its enlargement process, 
in which candidate states have been essentially 
built by member states, the European Union has 
become the exporter of good governance par 
excellence. 
The EU has been keen to promote itself as a 
policy leader in the field of good governance. 
In this, it has been supported by academic com-
mentators who emphasize that the EU is unique 
as a policy actor, exercising “soft power” or 
“normative power,” while building a “voluntary 
empire.” Particularly among European commen-
tators, the EU’s exercise of power and influence 
is contrasted positively to the “neocolonial” or 
“hard power” approaches of the U.S. or of the 
individual member states. But an examination 
of the EU’s good governance approach to state-
building in Bosnia suggests that the technocratic 
and administrative legitimization of external 
intervention is not beyond criticism, in both nor-
mative and practical policy terms. 
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Strategic use of con-
ditionality means that 
the EU openly seeks 
to turn political issues 
into technical ones in 
order to massage and 
facilitate the reform 
process.
GOVERNANCE NOT GOVERNMENT
In many ways, the relationship of inequality 
between elected representatives in the Balkan 
region and the external regulatory bodies, 
such as the EU, is highlighted in the interna-
tional regulation of Bosnia and Kosovo. In both 
countries, the restrictions on local sovereignty 
and self-government, which institutionalize a 
relationship of inequality and external domina-
tion, do not stand out as exceptions. Rather, they 
indicate with greater clarity the problems raised 
by the export of good governance at the levels 
of institutional reform and civil society interven-
tion, in the context of an unequal “partnership.” 
In both Bosnia and Kosovo, there are elected 
governments at the local, regional and state lev-
els. Meanwhile, the international administration 
-- in Bosnia, under the Office of the High Repre-
sentative, and in Kosovo, under the International 
Civilian Representative -- is “double-hatted” 
with the position of EU Special Representative 
(EUSR). In both cases, the international admin-
istration is held to be part of a contractual process 
moving towards “ownership,” self-government 
and integration into European structures.
I n Bosnia, the EU is in the process of wind-ing down the Bonn executive powers of the High Representative, and the key question is 
how conditionality can now be used to provide 
the leverage previously provided by the threats 
of dismissals and direct imposition by the Office 
of the High Representative. The EU accession 
process is seen to be contractual, committing 
politicians to work toward advancing along the 
EU road. But conditionality is not about final 
membership conditions. The latter are open-
ended, due to uncertain enlargement criteria 
that depend not on an abstract set of technical 
or administrative factors, but rather on political 
considerations. Instead, conditionality is a pro-
cess of relationship management, which aims at 
incremental progress to ensure that reforms hap-
pen without stand-offs between politicians and 
EU administrators. 
Conditionality operates through the careful day-
to-day management of the accession and reform 
process, with EU officials wary of conflict that 
could result from asking for “too much too 
soon.” This delicate process of reform manage-
ment transfers the central political arena from 
the domestic sphere to the international one. The 
EU is not just deciding upon its own standards 
for new members. The EU policy engagement in 
the states of the region and the EU Special Rep-
resentatives are important political players in the 
societies which they seek to manage, attempting 
to make delicate political decisions on how to 
move the reform process forwards.
Here, the distinction between “hard” and “soft” 
powers in the context of the EU’s relationship 
with Balkan states is not of fundamental impor-
tance. Once tied into the accession process, the 
alleged “pull of Brussels” (EU conditionality) is 
no different from, for example, the “push from 
Bonn” (the executive powers of the OHR). The 
EUSR does not need to use executive powers 
once the policy process is institutionalized and 
incremental conditionality is used to oversee the 
policy process, setting the timetable for reforms 
and the policy content. 
While the fact that Bosnian politicians them-
selves vote for the requirements of EU accession 
is vital for the EU’s own credibility, the fact that 
policy is presented to the legislature as a fait 
accompli means there is little difference in the 
two approaches when viewed from the domestic 
perspective. Whether the policy is brought with 
the “hard” threat of dismissals or with the “soft” 
threat of funding withdrawals and the stalling of 
the accession process, there is still little opportu-
nity for domestic political parties to debate upon 
policy alternatives. The external framework of 
policymaking also means that political parties 
negotiate with the international administrator 
behind closed doors, rather than with each other 
in public.
This process of political management under the 
auspices of accession, or the “soft power” pull of 
Brussels, results in not just an externally driven 
political process, but also in one that is openly 
manipulative. Rather than clarifying what EU 
membership will involve, the pressure is for Bal-
kan elites to evade open or public discussion and 
instead to attempt to buy social acquiescence. 
The strategic use of conditionality also means 
that the EU openly seeks to turn political issues 
into technical ones in order to massage and fa-
cilitate the reform process. 
This was clear in Bosnia when police reform was 
billed as a technical necessity and conditional for 
accession, when there was no agreed-upon EU 
framework for centralized policing. This was an 
attempt to reshape the Dayton framework and 
weaken the powers of the Bosnian-Serb entity, 
but it was framed as a technical necessity. This 
instrumental and manipulative use of condition-
ality can also be seen in ongoing discussions to 
use human rights requirements to reform the tri-
partite voting for the Bosnian presidency. 
Rather than openly stating policy goals, which 
would be controversial, the current dynamic 
pushes controversial reforms under the guise 
of technical or administrative necessity. The 
political shaping of Balkan society by external 
managers tends to degrade the entire political 
process, hollowing out the opportunities for do-
mestic debate and engagement, and encouraging 
the collaboration of political elites and external 
administrators against the wishes and aspira-
tions of the citizens of these states.
I t is in this context that the “good gover-nance” conception of the role of civil soci-ety becomes important. The EU argues that 
it is more democratic than elected representa-
tives and has shared interests with the citizens 
of Balkan states. For example, opinion polls in 
Bosnia show that 85 percent of the population 
support joining the EU, including over 80 per-
cent of each of the three main ethnic constitu-
encies. For the EU, its interests are clearly the 
same as the Balkan peoples -- namely, a better 
future of peace, stability and prosperity. The EU 
is therefore not forcing anything on anyone. 
However, the passive opinion poll support for the 
EU is not reflected in major political party posi-
tions. The national question still plays a defining 
role for many Balkan states, for fairly obvious 
reasons. Rather than take into account the reali-
ties of the region, EU officials argue that the EU 
needs to “help bridge the gap” between political 
7Bosnia’s negotiations with the World Bank. One 
look at the Bosnian flag -- with the stars of the 
EU on a yellow-and-blue background that repro-
duces the colors of the EU flag -- demonstrates 
that Bosnia is more EU-orientated than any cur-
rent member state. 
However, the EU has distanced itself from any 
responsibility for the power it exercises over 
Bosnia. Formally Bosnia is an independent state 
and member of the United Nations, and a long 
way off from meeting the requirements of EU 
membership.
A fter 14 years of state-building in Bos-nia, there is now a complete separation between power and accountability. 
This clearly suits the EU, which is in a position 
of exercising control over the tiny state without 
either admitting it into the EU or presenting its 
policy regime in strict terms of external con-
ditionality. Bosnia is neither an EU member, 
nor does it appear to be a colonial protectorate. 
Bosnia’s formal international legal sovereignty 
gives the appearance that it is an independent 
entity, voluntarily engaged in hosting its state 
capacity-building guests. The process of align-
ing domestic law with the large raft of EU regu-
lations appears to be a matter of domestic poli-
tics. There is no international forum in which 
the contradictions between Bosnian social and 
economic demands and the external pressures of 
Brussels’ policy prescriptions can be raised.
However, these questions are not ones of domes-
tic politics. The Bosnian state has no indepen-
dent or autonomous existence outside of the EU 
“partnership.” There are no independent struc-
tures capable of articulating alternative poli-
cies. Politicians are subordinate to international 
institutions through the established mechanisms 
of governance, which give EU bureaucrats and 
administrators the final say over policymaking. 
The Bosnian state is an artificial one, but it is 
not a fictional creation, playing a central role 
in the transmission of EU policy priorities in 
their most intricate detail. The state here is an 
inversion of the sovereign state central to liberal 
modernity. Rather than representing a collec-
tive political expression of Bosnian interests, 
self-government and autonomy -- “Westphalian 
sovereignty,” in the terminology of state-build-
ers -- the Bosnian state is an expression of an 
externally driven agenda.
The more Bosnia has been the subject of external 
ternal EU actors, rather than engage in domestic 
constituency-building. Even more problemati-
cally, the fact that it is in the interests of political 
elites and EU officials to keep the process of 
relationship-management going means that lo-
cal political elites are increasingly drawn away 
from engaging with their citizens (in ways simi-
lar to political elites in member states). Rather 
than exporting democracy and legitimizing 
new state structures, the process of EU member 
state-building is leading to a political process in 
which the voters and the processes of electoral 
representation are seen to be barriers to reform, 
rather than crucial to it. 
THE GOVERNANCE STATE
States that are not designed to be independent 
political subjects in anything but name are a fa-
çade without content. States without political au-
tonomy may have technically sound governance 
and administrative structures on paper. But the 
atrophied political sphere hinders attempts to 
cohere post-conflict societies and overcome so-
cial and political divisions. The states so created, 
which have international legal sovereignty but 
have ceded policymaking control to external of-
ficials in Brussels, lack organic mechanisms of 
political legitimation as embodiments of a col-
lective expression of the will of their societies. 
Their relationship of external dependency upon 
the EU means that the domestic political sphere 
cannot serve to legitimize the political authori-
ties or cohere their societies. 
Bosnia is the clearest case of a new type of 
“good governance state” being built through the 
EU enlargement process of distancing power 
and political responsibility. For all intents and 
purposes, Bosnia is a member of the European 
Union; in fact, more than this, Bosnia is the first 
genuine “EU state,” where sovereignty has, in 
effect, been transferred to Brussels. The EU 
provides its government; the international High 
Representative is an EU employee and the EU’s 
Special Representative in Bosnia. This EU ad-
ministrator has the power to directly impose 
legislation and to dismiss elected government 
officials and civil servants. EU policy and 
“European Partnership” priorities are imposed 
directly through the European Directorate for 
Integration. The EU also runs the police force 
(having taken over from the United Nations at 
the end of 2002) and the military (taken over 
from NATO at the end of 2004), and manages 
elites and the people. This “gap-bridging” is held 
to be the task of civil society, with civil society 
groups funded and encouraged to talk about sin-
gle issues that the EU is keen to promote -- from 
the importance of small- and medium-sized en-
terprises to issues of jobs, crime, corruption and 
healthcare. The EU argues that its missions and 
Special Representatives listen to the people and 
civil society, while the elected politicians do not.
This “democratic” discourse, which portrays the 
EU as the genuine representative of the people 
against the illegitimate or immature politicians, 
fits well with allegations that politicians do not 
have the citizens’ public interests at heart and 
therefore must be motivated by private concerns 
of greed and self-interest. It also tends to dis-
count the votes expressed in elections as being 
the product of manipulation by elites or elec-
toral immaturity. The process of conditionality 
around an external agenda is then seen to be 
stymied or blocked by the processes of domestic 
representation (much as the Irish electorate was 
seen to be irrationally blocking the Lisbon trea-
ty, implying that the votes of the public should 
count for less than the consensus of international 
experts). 
This elitist discourse results in a manipulative 
view of conditionality, where political decision-
making seeks to evade public accountability. 
In Bosnia, EU experts and political elites talk 
about a “window of opportunity” for reforms, 
alleged to have begun after the last municipal 
elections in October 2008 and running through 
the next state-level elections in 2010. A process 
of manipulation has developed whereby politics 
is actively excluded from the public sphere, and 
decision-making is a matter of elite negotiation 
with Brussels. In short, the EU is reproducing 
itself through the state-building process in states 
such as Bosnia. 
EU member state-building in the region is a 
clear example of the limitations of this good gov-
ernance discourse. In states that have a tenuous 
relationship to their societies, the EU’s relation-
ship-management sucks the political life from 
those societies, institutionalizing existing politi-
cal divisions between ethnic or national groups 
by undermining the need for public negotiation 
and compromise between domestic elites. 
The externally driven nature of the policy pro-
cess means that political elites seek to lobby ex-
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state-building, the less it has taken on the fea-
tures of the traditional liberal state form. Here, 
the state is a mediating link between the “inside” 
of domestic politics and the “outside” of inter-
national relations, but rather than clarifying the 
distinction it removes the distinction completely. 
The imposition of an international agenda of 
good governance appears internationally as a 
domestic question and appears domestically as 
an external, international matter. Where the lib-
eral paradigm of sovereign autonomy clearly de-
marcated lines of policy accountability, the good 
governance agenda blurs them. In this context, 
domestic politics has no real content, and there 
is very little at stake in the political process. In 
fact, political responsibility for policymaking 
disappears with the removal of the liberal rights-
based framework of political legitimacy.
CONCLUSION
For external state-builders, the subordination 
of politics to bureaucratic and administrative 
procedures of good governance is a positive 
development. In functional terms, they argue 
that sovereignty, and the political competition 
it brings with it for control of state power, is a 
luxury that Balkan states often cannot afford. 
Leading commentators have argued that many 
states now negotiating EU ties are “troubled so-
cieties,” plagued by economic, social and ethnic 
divisions that could turn elections into highly 
problematic “winner take all” situations. In 
these states, according to this argument, uncon-
ditional sovereign independence is a curse rather 
than a blessing, and conflict can be prevented by 
enabling “external constraints” on autonomy in 
exchange for institutional capacity-building. 
Post-transition and post-conflict states, such as 
those in the Balkans, stand in desperate need of 
a state-building project which can engage with 
and cohere society around a shared future-ori-
entated perspective. Instead, what they receive 
from European Union state-builders is exter-
nal regulation, which has, in effect, prevented 
the building of genuine state institutions that 
can engage with and represent social interests. 
These weakened states are an inevitable product 
of the technical, bureaucratic and administrative 
approach exported under the paradigm of “good 
governance.” 
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9Many of the U.N. officials 
were poorly trained, in-
competent or just did not 
care.
BY DAMIEN KINGSBURY 
LESSONS LEARNED IN TIMOR-LESTE 
A little more than 10 years after the people of what is now Timor-Leste voted for independence, this small, 
half-island country has compressed into a few 
short years what many other post-colonial states 
have taken decades to achieve. It has been 
largely destroyed, achieved independence, had 
a political crisis, transitioned to democracy, 
and now appears to be heading into a period of 
political calm and economic growth. After the 
near-catastrophic events of 2006, Timor-Leste’s 
prospects are looking relatively positive, even if 
a number of important caveats apply. 
After roughly 300 years of Portuguese colonial 
neglect came to an end in December 1975, what 
was then known as Portuguese Timor was in-
vaded by neighboring Indonesia. The territory 
became a war zone: More than a quarter of the 
population was killed or died as a result of the 
subsequent occupation (which was never recog-
nized under international law), and the rest was 
deeply traumatized. 
Twenty-three years later, when Indonesia’s Su-
harto was pushed from office in 1998, Jakarta 
was in the midst of a financial crisis. The cost of 
the occupation of Timor Leste, both financially 
and in terms of its continuing damage to Indone-
sia’s international reputation, alienated the new 
president, B. J. Habibie, and his technocratic 
peers, and interfered with his attempts to oversee 
Indonesia’s political reform. Faced with increas-
ing calls for some sort of long-term political 
transition towards self-determination, Habibie 
unexpectedly announced that Timor-Leste could 
vote on whether it wished to be independent or 
an “autonomous” province within Indonesia. 
In an attempt to ensure that Timor-Leste re-
mained part of Indonesia, the Indonesian mili-
tary (TNI) established pro-integration militias 
and embarked on a campaign of intimidation 
and terror. The campaign failed, and in a U.N.-
supervised ballot on Aug. 30, 1999, 78.5 percent 
of registered East Timorese voters chose inde-
pendence. In response, the TNI and its proxy 
militias went on a rampage, murdering at least 
1,400 people and burning around 70 percent 
of the country’s infrastructure. International 
negotiations resulted in an Australian-led mul-
tinational military force, INTERFET, entering 
Timor-Leste. INTERFET brought an end to the 
destruction and violence, the withdrawal of In-
donesian forces, and the return of the U.N. But 
in the aftermath of the violence, Timor-Leste 
was left with virtually no infrastructure and a 
deeply traumatized, poorly educated and largely 
unskilled population. 
In the lead-up to the ballot, popular expectations 
of independence were high. The post-ballot re-
ality, however, was not only that independence 
had not delivered a significantly better outcome, 
but that living conditions actually declined. 
Meanwhile, the U.N., tasked with building a 
country from the ground up, ran the territory as 
a fiefdom. 
D espite its many competencies, the U.N. was not especially well-suited to the job of nation-building. Many of 
its officials were poorly trained, incompetent or 
just did not care. Rather than imparting skills 
and building capacity, U.N. officials often found 
it easier just to do the job themselves, leaving 
untrained Timorese to watch. 
It did not take long before bitterness over this 
new reality, desperate competition for reduced 
resources, and political opportunism led to a 
push for formalizing independence, even if it 
meant what then looked to be an early inter-
national withdrawal. A new constitution was 
drawn up, in which the parliament would be the 
executive body of state, with the president oc-
cupying a largely ceremonial position. In part, 
the move to have a ceremonial president was 
intended to avoid the personal excesses of other 
executive presidencies, such as Indonesia. But 
the largest party, Fretilin, also wished to hobble 
presidential aspirant Xanana Gusmao, who had 
been at odds with Fretilin’s political leader, Mari 
Alkatiri. 
Independence was formally declared in 2002, 
with Fretilin, led by a group who had spent their 
exile overseas, taking two-thirds of the parlia-
mentary seats. Gusmao became Timor-Leste’s 
first president, and Alkatiri was appointed prime 
minister.
Timor-Leste was at this time one of the poorest, 
most disadvantaged countries in the world. The 
new government was faced with running a coun-
try still only partially built, reliant on foreign aid 
and with a population both poorly trained and 
increasingly desperate. In the face of such cir-
cumstances, and with old rivalries resurfacing 
as the unity of the independence struggle faded 
into memory, East Timorese divided along po-
litical and ethnic faultlines that led to challenges 
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It became clear that it was not possible to 
establish, much less embed, the institutions 
of state in a few short years, and that limited 
resources, patronage and corruption were 
an explosive mix.
to government authority. Serious rioting in 2003 
and 2004 led to heavy-handed police responses, 
making clear that the decision to only partially 
retrain the police, many of whom had served 
under the Indonesian occupation, was an error. 
As “liberators of the people,” former guerrilla 
armies often continue to see themselves as the 
guardians of the state, rather than as its servants. 
This has led to the active involvement of newly 
independent militaries in the politics of many 
developing countries. Similarly, the politics of 
post-colonial states can continue to be informed 
by the methods and networks of the resistance 
period, including top-down decision making, 
black market sources of income, a lack of pro-
cedural consistency or transparency, and, some-
times, recourse to intimidation and violence. All 
of these qualities pervaded Timor-Leste’s initial 
years of independence. 
The question was also raised whether the cre-
ation of the Falintil-Timor-Leste Defense Force 
(F-FDTL) was just a sop to ex-combatants from 
the independence struggle. At around 1,500 
troops, the army was too small to be an effec-
tive defensive force, a role that was in any case 
guaranteed by the international community, yet 
it consumed 8 percent of the budget. Its potential 
for becoming politically involved, too, worried 
many. 
M ore positively, income from Timor Gap oil and gas resources began to accumulate in a U.S. Treasury bonds-
based “oil fund.” Yet Timor-Leste’s economic 
problems involved not just having enough funds, 
but also in developing the capacity to adequately 
spend them. At one level, a high degree of bu-
reaucratic centralization meant that funds were 
slow to be distributed, especially beyond Dili. 
This level of centralized control was intended to 
limit corruption, which was already problematic. 
But it also meant that financial liquidity in the 
districts was in desperately short supply. 
In response to growing public disenchantment, 
the government became increasingly uncom-
municative, brittle and tending towards authori-
tarian. Divisions opened up with the Catholic 
Church over education policy, the poorly trained 
police became notorious for corruption and 
brutality, and the F-FDTL became divided -- 
between older members and newer recruits, ex-
guerrillas and the formerly Indonesian police, as 
well as along geographic and ethnic lines. Citing 
discrimination, newer army recruits constituting 
about a third of the army staged a protest in Dili 
on April 28, 2006. The protest was joined by 
other anti-government groups and quickly grew 
out of control, resulting in widespread rioting. 
The prime minister called in the rest of the army, 
and five people were shot dead, with many more 
wounded. 
Thereafter, the state began its descent into chaos. 
Soldiers attacked the police, killing 11 officers 
even after they had surrendered. A small group 
of dissident soldiers went into the hills, attack-
ing “loyal” forces that chased after them. Gangs 
that were organized around the martial arts, as 
well as others with links to political elites, at-
tacked both each other and East Timorese from 
what were perceived to be competing language 
groups. This linguistic cleavage was quickly de-
fined as a conflict of “East” versus “West,” and 
although such an oversimplification was inaccu-
rate, its currency quickly defined reality. 
As the police force disintegrated and civil vio-
lence became widespread, the Fretilin govern-
ment called in international support in the form 
of the International Stabilization Force (ISF) 
-- comprised of Australian and New Zealand 
soldiers and Portuguese and Malaysian para-
military police -- and the renewed intervention 
of the U.N. and its police contingent. The worst 
of the violence was contained within weeks, 
although sporadic outbursts continued until the 
end of the following year. 
A s a result of the violence, more than three-dozen people were killed, and around 160,000 people -- who were ei-
ther displaced from or lost their homes -- quickly 
settled into internally displaced persons camps 
in and near Dili. A gang of soldiers led by Alfre-
do Reinado retreated into the hills, while other 
dissident soldiers set up camp near Ermera, to 
the southwest of Dili. At an elite political level, 
under intense pressure, Alkatiri resigned as 
prime minister. Gusmao installed José Ramos-
Horta as interim prime minister until the sched-
uled 2007 elections. 
The violence and destruction of 2006 had many 
impacts, not least of which was to shock and fur-
ther dismay a still-traumatized people. Violence 
in Timor-Leste, however, had become accultur-
ated, and in some respects domesticated. But the 
belief that a traumatized and still poorly trained 
people and government could stand alone was 
shown to be wanting: It became clear that it was 
not possible to establish, much less embed, the 
institutions of state in a few short years, and 
that limited resources, patronage and corruption 
were an explosive mix. Timor-Leste reflected 
problems common to many developing coun-
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However, the decision to tap into the oil reserve 
fund was controversial. Fretilin attacked the 
government for abandoning the previous policy 
of only using the interest from the fund for gov-
ernment spending. There were also concerns 
about the potential impact of the so-called “re-
source curse,” where an economy, buoyed by re-
source income, inflates the value of its currency, 
thereby damaging non-resource export capacity, 
often with implications for employment. The 
windfall profits also often fuel corruption. 
W hile Timor-Leste’s only export industries were hydrocarbons and coffee, its currency was the U.S. 
dollar. Meanwhile, unemployment was more 
determined by subsistence farmers moving to 
towns in search of paid work, limiting the poten-
tial for that component of the “curse.” However, 
there were numerous allegations about corrup-
tion and nepotism, most of which were not well-
substantiated at the higher levels of government, 
but which appeared to have considerable valid-
ity elsewhere. To counter this, the government 
launched an anti-corruption drive, with limited 
success.
To further increase liquidity among the wider 
community, and in part to buy off potential dis-
affection, the government also made payments 
to resistance veterans. This was later supple-
mented by a small pension for people over the 
age of 60, as the average life expectancy had 
improved to just over 60 years of age, up from 
the mid-50s just a few years before. 
But more importantly, the government moved 
to decentralize the state, reconstituting each of 
its 13 districts as a municipality with an elected 
council and an executive mayor. Each of the 
districts would have control over spending for 
a range of areas outside those retained by the 
central government, with funding to be distrib-
uted on a per capita basis. The purpose of this 
decentralization was to give local people greater 
control over their lives, and to ensure that capital 
was adequately distributed outside Dili. 
For the 2008-9 financial year, Timor-Leste re-
corded 13 percent economic growth, if off of 
a very low base and almost entirely dependent 
on government spending. Inflation had fallen to 
around 6 percent, down from highs in the low 
teens only a few years previously. More omi-
nously, though, the country’s fertility rate had 
ment spending. It was, Gusmao said, important 
to save for the future, but not at the expense of 
being unable to live in the present.
The political situation, however, remained 
volatile. Reinado and his gang continued to play 
“cat and mouse” with the ISF. Dissident soldiers 
moved into a cantonment, from where they were 
to negotiate their grievances, at a halting pace. 
And the IDP camps became the site of political 
unrest. Then, at dawn on the morning of Feb. 
11, 2008, Reinado snapped. Sensing, correctly, 
that the government’s initial negotiations with 
the dissident soldiers might ultimately leave him 
isolated, Reinado and his gang split into two 
groups, one targeting President Ramos-Horta 
for assassination, and the other targeting Prime 
Minister Gusmao.
In the ensuing attacks, Reinado himself and one 
of his followers were shot dead. Ramos-Horta 
was shot and critically wounded. Gusmao es-
caped uninjured. 
Ramos-Horta was evacuated first to an Aus-
tralian military hospital and then to Darwin, 
Australia, for life-saving surgery. The event 
sent a shockwave through Timor-Leste and the 
international community. Yet rather than herald-
ing further state failure, the violence shocked 
many East Timorese into revising their divided 
perspectives. Reinado’s death also left the more 
belligerent anti-Fretilin groups without the gal-
vanizing figure of a romanticized outlaw hero.
The rest of Reinado’s gang was quickly captured 
or surrendered, and the dissident soldiers, now 
isolated, agreed to a deal with the government in 
which they would receive $8,000 in exchange for 
resigning from the army. With the security en-
vironment increasingly settled, the government 
was then able to clear the IDP camps, assisted 
by payments of around $5,000 per family to help 
them rebuild their lost homes. Further, the AMP 
government purchased large stocks of rice, both 
for subsequent warehousing and distribution at 
subsidized prices, in order to alleviate a short-
age caused by price increases. The effort was 
enhanced by the end of a long-running drought, 
allowing local crops to again return to surplus. 
The injection of liquidity boosted the economy, 
and in an environment in which such largesse 
could have seriously depleted the government’s 
coffers, an unexpected financial windfall from 
rising oil revenues assisted the extra spending. 
tries -- including desperation, brittle control, 
institutional breakdown and government failure 
-- and almost became a failed state.
A head of the 2007 elections, Gusmao established a new party, the Congress for Timorese National Reconstruction, 
whose initials, CNRT, played on the Council for 
Timorese National Resistance, which had been 
the coalition of all parties under which Timor-
Leste won independence. The CNRT drew from 
other parties, but especially from disaffected 
members of Fretilin, many of whom resented the 
dominance within the party by those who had 
spent the occupation in exile. The initial voting 
for the presidency in 2007 demonstrated the 
erosion of Fretilin’s popular support. The party 
achieved the largest plurality among a crowded 
field in first-round voting, but at roughly 30 per-
cent, its tally amounted to half that of the previ-
ous election held in 2001. In the second-round 
run-off, the non-Fretilin vote went entirely to 
Ramos-Horta, who won with around 70 percent. 
The election period was tense, with some spo-
radic violence. However, a relatively high inter-
national and military presence allowed the sub-
sequent parliamentary elections to proceed more 
or less unhindered. Fretilin again won just under 
30 percent of the vote, achieving the largest plu-
rality and quickly demanding to be allowed to 
form a government on that basis. However, Gus-
mao put together a majority coalition of minor 
parties, which the new president, Ramos-Horta, 
appointed to govern, with Gusmao as prime 
minister. 
Fretilin refused to accept this outcome, saying 
that the constitution gave the largest vote-getter 
the opportunity to form the government. Its 
militants immediately went on a rampage, burn-
ing houses and killing a small number of people. 
However, the constitution includes a clause al-
lowing for a majority coalition government. Giv-
en that such a majority coalition was available, 
this outcome was consistent with democratic 
principle. Reflecting its coalition status, the gov-
ernment became known as the Parliamentary 
Majority Alliance (AMP). 
In the face of continuing pro-Fretilin protests, 
the AMP government began initiating reforms. 
Key among them was to make foreign invest-
ment easier, to reduce and simplify the tax code 
and, as its tenure progressed, to increase govern-
LE
S
S
O
N
S
 L
E
A
R
N
E
D
 I
N
 T
IM
O
R
-L
E
S
TE
12 WPR | THE PRACTICE AND POLITICS OF NATION-BUILDING 2009
exploded, with eight live births per female, mak-
ing it the most fertile country in the world. This 
not only seriously unbalanced the population, so 
that about half of Timor-Leste was under the age 
of 16, but led to population growth that could 
not be sustained by the productive capacity of 
the increasingly distressed natural environment. 
Despite progressive government policies, defor-
estation continued and potable water supplies 
remained inadequate. Furthermore, in order to 
provide electricity for the whole country, the 
government opted for two heavy oil generators 
that were not only environmentally unfriendly, 
but would be increasingly expensive to run. 
Timor-Leste’s foreign relations were also tested, 
especially by Australia and Indonesia. As the 
main source of imports, Indonesia had consider-
able capacity to influence Timor-Leste’s internal 
affairs. As an example, in August 2009, when 
Indonesia’s foreign minister refused to leave the 
airport to attend the 10th anniversary of the bal-
lot on independence unless an arrested militia 
leader was released, Prime Minister Gusmao 
complied, in breach of his country’s own laws. 
The release called further attention to how, in 
order to appease its large neighbor, Timor-Leste 
had not pursued various charges resulting from 
Indonesia’s brutal occupation and bloody depar-
ture in 1999. 
As is often the case, many of Timor-Leste’s prob-
lems following independence were common to 
post-colonial states, while some remained spe-
cific to Timor-Leste. Among the former is the 
challenge, sometimes contentious, of combining 
separate language groups within a single admin-
istrative entity. Although Portuguese and Tetum 
are Timor-Leste’s official national languages, 
English and Indonesian are widely used “work-
ing” languages, with more than two dozen other 
languages and dialects also in use. About 70 per-
cent of the population speaks one of the four dia-
lects of Tetum, and 80 percent speak Indonesian. 
Portuguese is spoken by less than 15 percent of 
the population, and English is the popularly 
preferred third language. Since state documents 
and court hearings are written and conducted in 
Portuguese, they are inaccessible to most East 
Timorese. It is common for new states to develop 
a state language, and it seems that Tetum might 
become that. Tetum is the spoken language in 
the parliament, and there is an increasing ten-
dency to publish in Tetum. However, while this 
process is underway, Timor-Leste faces, at best, 
linguistic confusion. 
On the other hand, Timor-Leste was lucky com-
pared with many newly independent countries, 
in having a relatively large oil and natural gas 
supply within its territorial boundaries. If man-
aged carefully, this could underpin development 
for decades. However, if mismanaged, Timor 
Leste, like others before it, could experience 
the “resource curse” of increased corruption, 
rent-seeking behavior, an artificially inflated 
economy and an inevitable economic slump.
In the short term, however, much of this wealth 
is being used to ease some of the burden of pov-
erty that characterized Timor-Leste, and hence 
to ease pressures that many developing states 
face before they manage to consolidate state in-
stitutions. In this, Timor-Leste has bought itself 
some time. 
A s 2009 progresses into 2010, there are increasing signs of East Timorese wanting to again take control of their 
own affairs. At one level, a push for greater lo-
cal control is to be expected for an independent 
state managing to put its brush with civil conflict 
and potential state failure behind it. At another 
level, however, is the possibility that moving 
too quickly towards such decentralized control 
could result in a repetition of the failures that led 
to the crisis of 2006, in turn implying a cycle of 
failure all too common to developing countries. 
However, economic growth and redistribution 
augured well, as did the general policy settings 
of both the government and the opposition. And 
importantly, the commitment to electoral poli-
tics by the people of Timor-Leste showed that 
democracy did not require a long history for it to 
embed itself among the country’s citizens. That, 
in turn, provided a managed way in which to 
order and resolve competing interests.
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